Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

Salt Lake City, A Municipal Corporation v. State of
Utah : Brief of Defendant-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Leon A. Halgren; Attorney for Plaintiff-RespondentsPhil L.
Hansen and Dallin W. Jensen; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake City v. Utah, No. 11141 (Utah Supreme Court, 1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/67

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporati on, Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

11141

STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant-A. ppellant.

Brief of Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from Declaratory Judgment
of the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah
Honorable Leonard W. Elton, Judge

LEON A. HALGREN
Assistant City Attorney
414 City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffllespondent

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
DALLIN W. JENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant

}-

~

LED

·····-------.. ·-----------------------------

....;:~. ~.

•,.__ ·,;..,,,.o

Cc.u1~.

U!a!t

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

XATURE OF THE CASE----------------------------------

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT____

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------

3

ARGUJ\1ENT ------------------------------------------------------------

8

POINT I. SALT LAKE CITY HAS BEEN
LIMITED IN ITS AUTHORITY TO
CHARGE THE STATE FOR THE WATER
L'SED ON THE CAPITOL GROUNDS AND
IN THE BUILDINGS LOCATED ON
THESE GROUNDS. ---------------------------------------------- 8
POINT II. THE CITY WAS NOT ACTING ULTRA VIRES OF ITS AUTHORITY
IN MAKING THE USE OF 'i\T ATER
AYAILABLE TO THE STATE 'i\TITHOUT CHARGE. -------------------------------------------------------- 12
POINT III. THERE 'i\T AS AMPLE CONSIDERATION FOR BOTH THE 1890 AND
THE 1926 GRANT OF WATER BY THE
CITY AND THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
CONSIDERATION CANNOT NOW BE
QUESTIONED.
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Paat
A. AS TO THE 1890 GRANT ........................ Ii
~

B. AS TO THE 1926 CONTRACT ............... 2i

POINT IV. IN THE ALTERNATIVE IT
IS SUBMITTED THAT THE GRANT OF
'V ATER BY THE CITY CAN BE SUS.
TAINED AS CONVEYANCE OF A PORTION OF THE CITY'S 'VATER RIGHT ..... 21

1

POINT V. THE ADOPTION OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION DID NOT APPLY ,
RETROACTIVELY TO V 0 I D THIS
GRANT ....................................................................... 27
POINT VI. THE STATE HAS ACQUIRED
THE RIGHT TO THE USE ·OF THIS
WATER UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
ADVERSE POSSESSION ................................... 31
POINT VII. AT THIS LATE DATE THE
CITY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF ITS
GRANT OF WATER TO THE STATE.
A. ESTOPPEL .................................................... 33
B. LACHES .........................................................

1

I

j

36 i

POINT VIII. ANY CLAIM FOR PAY·
MENT THAT THE CITY HAD FOR THE
YALUE OF WATER WHICH IT HAS DE- :
LIVERED TO THE STATE IS NOW BAR· .
RED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITA· 3M,
TIONS ...................................................................... .
1

31 .

CONCLUSION ················································
,
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
AUTHORITIES CITED
C11ited States Constitution
Article I, Section 10 ---------------------------·····---- 30, 31

Clah Constitution
Article Xl, Section 6 ------------------------ 2, 8, 14, 27
Article XXIV, Section 1 --··--··-----·-------------·--------30
Article XIX, Section 1 -----·--·-----------·--------------- 30

Ltah Statutes
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, Chapter X,
Section 306 ---------------------------·····----·-----------------24
Section 73-3-1 -------·----·········-···-----------------------------32
37
Section 78-12-25 ··---------------···-·····-··--·-------------------CASES
Argyle v. Mitchell, 59 Utah 263, 202 Pac. 542

(1921) ---------------------------------------------------········-········
26

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) ........ 26
Brummit v. Ogden Waterworks Co., 33 Utah 285,
93 Pac. 829 ( 1908) -··--·--·---··-·--····-······-------------·--·
14
City of Big Spring v. Board of Control, 389 S.W.
2d 523 (Texas 1965), 404 S.W. 2d 810
(Texas 1966) ·--------------------------------------- 16, 20, 35
City of East Cleveland v. Board of Education,
157 N.E. 575 (Ohio 1927) -----------------------·-····· 11
C'ity of Gainesville v. Board of Control of the State
of Florida, 81 So. 2d 514 (Florida 1955) 9, 14, 17
111

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page

Ebel v. City of Baker, 299 P. 313 (Oregon
32, 37
1931) ·························································
Fretz v. City of Edmond, 168 P. 800 (Okla. 1916) .. 13

Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 Pac. 2d 894
( 1937) ........................... ·····--··-····················-····"
32
Higgins v. Oklahom?.. City, 127 P. 2d 845 (Okla.
1937) ...................................................................... 2j

Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Company,
177 U.S. 558, (1900) ··········-········----·········--·11, 31
McDonald v. Price, 45 Utah 464, 146 Pac. 550
(1915) ························································
2!
McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203,
85 p. 2d 608 ( 1938) ·····················-·---·······-····
.. ·· 28 :
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Spry,
16 Utah 222 ( 1898) -------------········------······-·······
... 28 ·
Morgan v. Johnson, 106 F. 452 (1901) .................. 2i :

New Orleans 'Vaterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. I
67 4 ( 1885) .................................................... 11, 31 ;

Omaha Water Company v. City of Omaha, 147 F. l ,
( 1906) .................................................................... 11

Reed v. City of Anoka, 88 N. ,V. 981 (Minn.
'
17
1902) ···-·-···-·····················-······-··········-·····----·
Salt Lake City v. Investment Company, 43 Utah
181, 134 Pac. 603 (1913) .................................... '36
Salt Lake City v. Tax Commission of Utah, 11 U. 9
2d 359, 359 P. 2d 397 (1961) -····-·-········--···"·
Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36 (1889) --·--·-

. 28

Snow v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P. 2d 28
234 ( 1948) ........................................................ ..
lV
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page

Wall Y. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 Pac. 766
(1917) ··························································---------34
Walla \Valla City v. \Valla 'Valla \Vater Company,
172 U.S. 1 (1898) ------------------------------------------------ 30

TREATISES
16 Am. J ur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Section 441 ____ 31
17 Am. J ur. 2d, Contracts, Section 102 ------------------ 22

G1 C.J .S. 'Vaters, Section 286 --------------------------------

9

1 Corbin on Contracts, Section 121 ---------------------------· 23
1 Corbin on Contracts, Section 122 ---------------------------- 23
1 Corbin on Contracts, Section 127 ---------------------------- 22
2 }lcQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section 4.03

(3rd ed. 1966) -----------------------------------------------·--·· 9
10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section
28.38a (3rd ed. 1966) ---------------------------------------- 24
10 l\IcQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section

28.43 (3rd ed. 1966) ............................................ 24

10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section

28.47 (3rd ed. 1966) ............................................ 24

10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section

28.55 (3rd ed. 1966) -------------------------------------------- 32

10 JlcQuillin. Municipal Corporations, Section

49.09 (3rd ed. 1966) ............................................ 36

12 .'.\IcQuillin, Muincipal Corporations, Section
34.104 (3rd ed. 1950) .......................................... 12
v
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section

i

49.06 (3rd ed. 1968) ........................................ 37 :

2

Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Section 2201
(3rd ed. 1943) .................................................... 29 ,

6 Thompson on Real Property, Section 3130

(Replacement 1962) ............................................ 25

Vt

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
)
corporation.
Plailztiff-Respondent,
\Case No.
) 11141
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant-Appellant.

Brief of Defendant-Appellant

NATURE OF THE CASE
Salt Lake City filed this action seeking a declaration of the rights and duties of the State and the City
under an 1890 grant, and supplemental contract in 1926,
1rhich provided that the City would furnish water for
use on the State Capitol Grounds and in the buildings
that have been erected on these grounds without charge
to the State.

In this brief, the State of Utah will be referred to

as the State, and the Territory of Utah will be referred

1
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to as the Territory; Salt Lake City will be referred tu
as the City. When the rights of the State are referrea
to it in this brief it will include the rights acquired by the
Territory.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
This matter was heard before the Honorable Leo11·
ard '~r. Elton of the Third Judicial District Court i11
and for Salt Lake County upon a written stipulation
of the Facts. At the hearing on this matter both the
City and the State moved for summary judgment. The
lower court granted the City's motion and held that
the grant of the free use of water by the City to the
State was null and void. The lower court concluded:
that the grant water was void because of a lack of con·
sideration; that the grant was in violation of the trust
under which the City must operate its water system
without favor or discrimination to its inhabitants; tha'.
the grant violated the public policy of the Territory ai
was later set forth in Art. XI, § 6 of the Utah Consti·
tution and that the 1926 agreement was in specific
violation of said constitutional provision; and. finally.
that a municipality holds water rights in a sacred trust
for the benefit of its inhabitants and this right cannot
be lost by estoppel, !aches or adverse use. The court
denied, without prejudice, the City's request for an
order which would allow the Citv to collect from the
·
State for water delivered in a separate
cause 0 f '·iction.·
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits that the decision of the lower
court should be reversed and that the City should be
reriuired to deliver water to the State Capitol grounds
and the buildings located on these grounds without any
charge to the State.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case was submitted on an agreed stipulation
of facts, which included three exhibits. Rather than
reiterate the information in the stipulation in its entirety, we will summarize the pertinent facts and then
direct the court's attention to the appropriate paragraphs of the stipulation as the argument is presented.
When the territorial government of Utah 'i~
the capitol from Fillmore to Salt Lake City, the City
conreyed 19.46 acres of land to the Territory for govermnental purposes. The State Capitol is located on
this site. This conveyance was made in 1888 and the
deed is attached to the stipulation of facts as Exhibit
·x (R. 16). The grant of land also conveyed to the
Territory a one-half interest in an additional five acres
of ground for reservoir purposes (R. 18). One of the
eon<litions of this deed was that the land not actually
11
1ed for governmental purposes be improved and maintained as a public park (R. 19). That same year the
l"iah Territorial Legislature created the Board of Comin:osioners on Capitol Grounds to take possession and
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control of the grounds conveyed by the City. The sum
of $25,000.00 was appropriated and expended to improve and beautify these grounds ( R. 10) .
As a part of this same arrangement and in order
to carry out certain of the conditions in the deed, !ht
City also granted the State the use of water for !ht
grounds and buildings located thereon. During the
1890 legisbtive session the Territorial legislature en·
acted the following legislation ( R. 11) :
.For the improvement of capitol grounds to
be drawn by and expended under the supervision
of the capitol commission ... $10,000.00.
Provided, that the above amount be expended
on condition that Salt Lake City furnish, free
of charge, sufficient water for said grounds and
for the building proposed to be erected thereon.
On May 6, 1890, the City adopted a resolution
granting the free use of water for the Capitol grounds
and buildings (R. 21):
Whereas the late Legislature appropriate~
the sum of $10,000.00 for the improvement o!
the Capitol Grounds with the proviso that the
City furnish water without charge for the
grounds and any building erected thereon.
Be it resolved that the free use of water ~e
granted to the Commission for the use ~f .1 e
Capitol Grounds and for the use of any bwidi~~g
erected thereon - in accordance with the specJ /
understanding with the City when arrangemen \
were made to begin work on said grounds.

4
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In order to furnish water to the Capitol grounds
aud buildings it was necessary to construct a reservoir
:wcl pipeli::e system. The Territory participated with
lhe City in the initial expense of constructing these
facilities. HoweYer, the City at its own expense has
replaced the old reservoir with steel storage tanks and
has cleaned the water line to the Capitol grounds (R.
12).

In 19H the State completed construction of the
l'tah State Capitol Building on the tract of land described in Exhibit "A". The cost of said building was
approximately $2,309,235.56 and an additional sum of
$126,ti86.85 was expended for the purpose of grading,
excarating, improving and parking the remaining land
comed by said conveyance. Upon completion of the
Capitol building the City immediately began the delivery of water to satisfy the needs and requirements
within the Capitol building and on the surrounding
grounds and this practice has continued up to the present time (R. 13 and 14).
Subsequent to the conveyance of land from the
City in 1888 the State acquired approximately twenty
acres of additional land surrounding the State Capitol
building and grounds ( R. 13) .

In 1926 the State and City entered into an agreement wherein the State agreed to improve and maintain
that portion of this additional twenty acres of land
, which was not being used for goyernment purposes as

5
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a park and the City agreed that its former grant would
extend to these lands ( R. 22) :
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered
into this 25th day of October, A.D. 1926, by and
between Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation
of Utah, and the State of Utah:
\VHEREAS the State of Utah has acquired
certain lands adjoining its present Capitol
Grounds in Salt Lake City, Utah, and it is now
the intention of the State of Utah to improre
said land and park the same and to maintain
the same as a part of the State Capitol Grounds.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of
said improvement and parking of said grounds.
and the perpetual maintenance thereof as the
State Capitol Grounds, said city does hereby
agree that its former grant to the State of the
perpetual free use of water for the Capitol
Grounds, and the purposes for which it was used,
shall also extend to such additional lands as shall
be parked, improved and maintained as a part
of the Capitol Grounds of the State.
It is understood and agreed that the State will
be as economical as possible in the use of the
water upon such additional land as shall ~e
parked and improved, and will conserve the said
water supply by using only a sufficient amount
to preserve and maintain the beauty of t~:
grounds, the lawns, flowers, trees and shrubbe.,
thereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the partie~
. han ds and se~h
hereto have hereunto set their
·b.
the day and year first above written. Done )
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authorilv of a resolution of the Board of Commissione'rs of Salt Lake City, Utah.

*

*

*

*

The State is supplied with water from the City
Creek portion of the City's water system. Over the
vears it has been necessary for the City to expend substa11tial sums of money to provide its residents with a
qLiality of water that would meet the health standards
of the State of Utah and the United States Department
uf Health ( R. 13). The State has not contributed any
funds toward these improvements, however, no claim is
being made in this action for reimbursement of these
expenditures ( R. 14) .
Since the construction of the Capitol Building in
mu the State has constructed a number of other buildings on the Capitol grounds for which the City has also
furnished water without charge (R. 14).
The Stale has, over the years, expended large sums
,Jmoncy to construct, landscape and improve the Capitol grounds as a public park and tourist attraction. In
addition the State expends a substantial amount of
money annually to maintain the Capitol grounds as a
public park ( R. 15).
In 1960 the City made a demand on the State to
1 )' for the use of this water. The State refused to
:::ukP payment alleging that it had no right or obliga::on to expend public funds for this purpose. This
action was then filed by the City.
13
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In the lower court the City relied primarily 011 the
following propositions to sustain its position: that the
grant in 1890 was ultra vires the power of the City
Commission; that the grant violated the common law 0'1
the Territory; that if the grant was valid in the first
instance Utah Constitution Art. XI, § 6 voided it anrl
that this constitutional provision prohibited the 1926
agreement; that there was no consideration for the grant
of the free use of water; and, finally, that the affirma·
tive defenses raised by the State are invalid. These contentions will be discussed as each relates to the poinb
of argument.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SALT LAKE CITY HAS BEEN LIMITED
IN ITS AUTHORITY TO CHARGE THE
STATE FOR THE WATER USED ON THE
CAPITOL GROUNDS AND IN THE BUILD·
INGS LOCATED ON THESE GROUNDS.
When the Territory appropriated the $10,000.0il
for use on the Capitol grounds in 1890 it expressly pro·
vided that the appropriation was on the condition that
the City was to furnish water without charge, Stipula·
tion of Fact No. 3 ( R. 11) . The City has accepted thi~
condition and limitation by its action in delivering water
. years. This al<M
to the State for over seventy- f ive
.·.
would constitute sufficient acceptance of this conrliti:'n
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ll'ithout any formal acceptance by the City Commission.
However, the City did by formal action in 1890 and
rnzo cxpre:-;sly accept the condition imposed upon it by
the legislature in 1890. By imposing this condition 011
the City the legislature limited the power of any future
city commission to charge the State for the water used
on the Capitol grounds and in the buildings. This legislative action did not disturb the general power of the
City to charge its inhabitants for the use of water but
merely limited the City's power as it affected the Stair..
As a creature of the State the legislative authority
om municipal corporations is plenary and virtually
unlimited, 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporation, § 4.03
t:Jrd ed. 196G); Salt Lake City v. Tax Commission of
['tah, 11 U. 2d 359, 359 P. 2d 397 (1961). Further,
the general power of a municipality to charge for water
, may be restricted by statute. 94 C.J.S. Waters, § 286.
The extent of legislative authority over cities in
this regard was discussed by the Supreme Court of
Florida in the case of City of Gainesville v. Board of
Control of the State of Florida, 81 So. 2d 514 (1955).
This was an action by the City of Gainesville to determine the rights of the City and the State under a contract where the City had, some forty-five years prior to
the action, agreed to furnish water to the State Uni·rersity without charge as an inducement for locating
the l'niYersity in the City. The court held that the
City was obligated tu continue to furnish the water without charge and in so doing reviewed the circumstances
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surrounding the location of the University within tlit
City. One matter commented on by the court was tnt
action of the Florida legislature in setting up a proct
<lure to determine a location of certain educational j11.
stitutions in the State of Florida and the requiremenh
imposed on certain municipalities under what wa,.
known as the "Buckman Act":
I
So in the Buckman Act and in Section 32j
of the Revised Statutes of Florida, the legislature, creator of municipalities, recognized, ap·
proved, and, at least in some instances, required
contributions from city treasuries of monies as
a condition to the establishment a.nd maintenance
of institutions of learning within their borders.
Further evidence of the attitude of the Je~s·
lature with regard to such donations is found in
Chapter 5498, Laws of Florida, Acts of 19Uj,
expressly empowering the City of Gainesville to
issue bonds for such amount as the city council
should determine "for the purpose of securing
educational advantages and facilities in or ad·
jacent to such city." F.S.A. § 282.01.
And as late as 1953 the legislature in a fo~t·
note to Item No. 62 of the appropriation bill.
" * * Provided that none of these monies shall
be used to purchase water from the City .J"
Gainesville," Chapter 28115, Laws of Flori a
1953, F.S.A. § 282.01, item 62. Of cours.e, 11 ;
realize that this was long after the promise 0
the citizens' committee was made but it doei
indicate to us that the legislative intent for~..
eight vears afterwards harmonized with l~nle
pattern· we think was set by t he ac t s t 0 wnc1
we have referred.

10
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Also compare City of East Cleveland v. Board oj'
Ji;d11catiu11, 15'7 N. E. 5'75 (Ohio 1927).
Limitations on the power of a city to charge for
1rater has been sustained as valid in other cases. In the
case of Lus Anyeles v. Los Angeles City Water Cornpan!J, 177 U.S. 558 (1900) the United States Supreme
Court upheld a contract where Los Angeles City had
leased its waterworks to a water company for a term
of 30 years and the company was to supply water to
the inhabitants of the city. The city agreed that this
was to be the exclusive supply of city water. The contract further provided that the city would not reduce
the water rates below what was then being charged by
its lessee. This contract was ratified by the California
legislature. The court concluded that this contract was
not a grant of the city's rate-making power but rather
a valid limitation upon it. It was also held that the
provisions of the new California constitution, which
would have prohibited the city from granting certain
of the privileges provided for in the contract, could not
affect an existing contract. Also see New Orleans
Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1885), and
the case of Omaha Water Company v. City of Ornaha,
Lli F. 1 (1906).
The condition and limitation placed on the City by
the Territorial legislature was valid when it was imposed, and applied when the parties executed the agreement in 1926 and it is a valid limitation today on the
City's power to charge the State for the use of this
11ater.

11
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POINT II
THE CITY WAS NOT ACTING ULTRA
VIRES OF ITS AUTHORITY IN MAKING
THE USE OF WATER A Y AILABLE TO THE
STATE WITHOUT CHARGE.
The City was acting within its authority to grant
the State the use oi water free of charge even if the
legislature had not expressly authorized such action.
Grants of this nature have been sustained as either a
donation or a binding contractural arrangement.
There was nothing inherently wrong with the City
providing the State with water free of charge as was
concluded by the lower court. Nor did this grant in any
way violate the public policy of the State. The action
of the City was in furtherance of a public purpose allrl
this is sufficient to justify not charging the State for
the use of this water, 12 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 34.104 (3rd ed. 1950):
Discriminations in the interest of the public
and which benefit the people generally appear
to be favored. Perhaps no rule can be formulated
with sufficient flexibility to apply to every case
that may arise. As once said: "It is only when
the discrimination inures to the undue advantage
of one man in consequence of some injustice
inflicted on another that the law intervenes f~r
the protection of the latter." Discrimination~ i1l
favor of the government or charitable i~st.1 h 1 •
tions, however, have been upheld. Discnmin:'
1
tions in favor of the public at large, it has bee 1
11
·
·
1uc
said, are not opposed to public policy masn
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as they benefit the people generally by relievi11g
them of part of their burdens and consequently
such discrimination cannot be held illegal in the
absence of legislation upon the subject.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of
F'rct;:: v. City of Edmond, 168 P. 800 (1916) specifically upheld a grant of free water to a public institution
on the grouu<l that it was for a public purpose:
The contention that the city has the power
in proper case to give from the resources of its
pubiic service plants to public institutions or
public uses without unjustly discriminating
against the rights of its inhabitants seems to
be supported by reason, logic, and abstract justice. A fire originates within the borders of a
city upon the property owned by some person
who has never been a user of the city water. The
fire is extinguished by water furnished by the
city plant. Can it be said that the city is required
to install a meter at some place upon the hose
line in order to determine the number of thousand gallons for which the owner of the property
must pay, or that by failing so to do and giving
the water, not only for the benefit of the private
indiYidual, but for the benefit of the public, it
unjustly discriminated against some person who
has paid for all the water that he used? The
statement of the proposition, of course, reveals
its absurdity, and shows that the conduct of the
city must be based, not upon absolute equality
of service, but upon discrimination which is not
essentially unjust. The public lavatories, rest
roorns, public fountains, and public parks maintained by cities, are all places where water is
donated for the public good. So it must seem
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that water might be given for use in the city hall
or the city's public buildings. Does the rul~
extend to those institutions which are owned and
controlled, not by the city, but by the State? We
can see no good reason for the distinction between them, where the state institution of learning is located within the city and redounds, as
it must both to the benefit of the business actirities of the city and to the intellectual and moral
life of its inhabitants. The support of that institution must be for the public good.
The case of Brummitt v. Ogden Waterworks Co.,
33 u tah 285, 93 Pac. 829 ( 1908) which is the principal
case the City relied on in the lower court does not con·
travene this proposition. In this decision the court was
concerned with the City delegating its general power
to fix rates and with the problem of prohibiting a private benefit at public expense. This is clearly distin·
guishable from this situation. Further, there is nothing
in Art. XI, § 6 of the Utah Constitution which would
require a completely uniform charge to all users of City
water. Hence, it would not matter whether such a grant
was made before or after the Utah Constitution was
adopted. Therefore, the 1926 agreement is valid even
if it is considered to be separate and distinct from thr
1890 grant. However, it appears that the 1926 contract
was an attempt to clarify and more clearly define the
limits of the prior arrangement of the parties regarding
the maintaining of the Capitol grounds as a pubhc
park.
In City of Gainesville v. Board of Control of the
14
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St 11 ie of Floi'ida, supra, the Florida court concluded
that there was authority for the city to make such grant:
By the express terms of the Buckman Act
the Board of Control was given the power "to
receive donations" and we construe this provision to authorize acceptance of donations by the
City of Gainesville. \:Ve have been directed to
no provision of the city charter, expressly granting to the city the power to enter such an agreement as was executed by the "committee of citizens." Nor has our research revealed express
authority so to contract.
. .1fter a careful study of this record, we conclude that the whole pattern for reorganizing
and maintaining the educational system offered
an opportunity for legal contributions by cities
from their funds in order to secure to the citizens
the obvious advantages of having institutions
located in their midst. True no express grant of
power so to contribute appeared in the Gainesville charter but it was properly implied from
the powers expressed.

*

*

*

*

The donation was, in effect, one for the benefit of the State, as well as the city, and was made
to agents of the State with apparent sanction
of the State. This, of course, would apply to any
city offering a similar inducement. And there
is nothing innately wrong with the donation. 'Ve
would have to hold it of such character on the
ground that no express power in that regard \Vas
given and none was given from which the power
could be implied or to which the power to spend
was incidental. 'Ve cannot find in the historv of
the transaction such defects or in the law ~uch

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a lack that would justify this absolute decision
Not only do we reject this conclusion but "~
think the action of the legislature in dealing
with the educational system for half a century
manifested a sanction by that body of the action
of the city-or on behalf of the city.
'Ve end the discussion 011 this point by remarking that in our opinion the commitment was not
void; that it was ratified both by the city and
the State.
The Texas court in the City of Big Spring t',
Board of Control, infra, had no difficulty in sustaining
a contract in which the City of Big Spring agreed t11
supply water to an agency of the State of Texas at a
specified rate for as long as the State maintained a
hospital within the city:
Under the first point it is argued that by the
contract the City of Big Spring surrendered its
right to determine the rates to be charged water
users for water; that this is a legislative or gor·
ernmental function, and a contract which is a
surrender by the City of such rights is therefore
void. Cases discussing governmental functions
of a city and its inability to delegate or surrender
these functions are cited to sustain this point
We have no quarrel with these cases. In the case
we have before us the City is exercising a pro·
prietary or business function only. In such
capacity a city can make a contract, u~der
authority of legislative enactment, in all tlu~g)
as an individual or private corporation. City
of Texarkana v. \Viggins, 151 Tex. 100. 2111
S. W. 2d 622 (1952); City of Crosbyton ·irl
Texas-New Mexico Utilities Co., 157 S.W. •1
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418, 420 (Tex. Civ. App., 1942, error refused,
want of merit) ; 39 Tex. J ur. 2d 638, § 308.

The Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota in
an early case when presented a similar question reached
this same conclusion. Reed v. City of Anoka, 88 N. W.
981 ( 190~) . The Minnesota Court concluded that
where large investments are required under long-term
contracts of this nature, these contracts should be a
matter of stability and not subject to the whim of each
succeeding municipal council. The court further concluded that the purpose of these contracts is not to govern but to secure for the municipality a private benefit,
hence are business in nature and not governmental.
At this late date all doubts concerning the authority of the City to make this grant should be resolved in
farnr of the grant being valid. As stated by the court
in the City of Gainesville case, supra:

i

i

I

I

I
I

The circuit judge thought there could be no
serious contention that the city had not either
authorized the contract in the first place, or
ratified it when it honored the agreement for
about fifty years. While he felt that a city could
not be estopped to assert the invalidity of a
contract that was ultra vires, he found that the
fact that the municipal officials, as well as the
members of the Board of Control, considered
that the city was acting within its powers highly
"persuasive to the conclusion that the City did
have power to make the contract."
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POINT III
THERE WAS AMPLE CONSIDERATION FOR BOTH THE 1890 AND THE rn2 11
GRANT OF WATER BY THE CITY AKD
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE CONSIDERATION CANNOT NOW BE QUESTIONED.
A. AS TO THB 1890 GRANT.
While the 1890 grant of water can be sustained
as a separate and distinct transaction from the grant
of land by the City to the Territory it is submitted that
the grant of land and water to the Territory eYolreil
out of one transaction even though the grants were made
in two separate documents. We direct the court's atten·
tion to the following facts which substantiate this
contention.
It is apparent from the recitals in deed of the land
and the grant of the water that the City was offering
the land and water to the Territory to gain the finanei:d
benefits which flow to the capitol city of the State. The
City also secured the benefit of an additional public
park (R. 19).
In addition to the 19.46 acres of land for goreni·
mental purposes, the grant of 1888 also comeyetl . 111
the Territory a one-half interest in an additional I 11
acres of ground for reservoir purposes ( R. 18 I· 1
seems apparent that the parties were contemplatii~g i;,
use of water under this original deed. The Terntor,;
.
. 1y t I1ougI1t t h e C1"t y was furnish1n.·
Legislature
obvious
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I

1

I

rater in 1888 when $25,000.00 was appropriated l.o
eonstruct a reservoir in conjunction with the City for
the purpose of supplying water to the grounds and
buildings and to improve and beautify the Capitol
grounds. .Further, the 1890 act which appropriated
$10,000.00 for the improvement of the Capitol grounds
was made on the express condition that the City furnish
water free of charge ( R. 11) .

1

This prior understanding concerning the City's
obligation to furnish free water was also reflected in
the City's resolution of May 6, 1890, wherein water wu~
granted for use on the Capitol grounds and any building
erected thereon, " . . . in accordance with the specific
understanding with the City when arrangements were
made to begin work on said grounds," ( R. 21). The
record is clear that the grant of land and water both
ernlred from the single transaction of relocating the
)late capitol.

I
1

Turning now to the matter of the consideration
which flowed to the City by virtue of this relocation.
We admit that this is somewhat of a unique contracl,
i l:ut that does not make in invalid. It is rare indeed that
1 astate government moves its capitol from one city to
another. Some of the background surrounding this
transaction is briefly reflected in the recitals of the
:ieed conveying the original 19.46 acres to the Territory
I i: 1888 (R. 16). However, suffice to say, the Territorr
\ ~,~il tl~e City reache~ a~ accord concer~ing the reloca. · nof the state capitol m Salt Lake City.
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Certainly the benefits the City received for relocating the state capitol within its boundaries was ample
consideration for the grant of the land and the water.
Salt Lake City's purpose in making the land and water
available to the Territory of Utah was to secure tbc
financial benefits which flow to a capitol city of a state.
The rewards to the City have been numerous am! i11 clude new residents, tourist trade, substantial state payrolls and periodic state expenditures of funds for capital improvements; as well as the construction and mai11tenance of an additional public park within the city.

There is a recent decision from the Supreme Cuuri
of the State of Texas which is factually almost identical
with this litigation and the Texas Court deals with a
number of the questions which have been raised in thh
litigation. City of Big Spring v. Board of Control, :J8~
S. vV. 2d 523, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas (19ti.51:
404 S.W. 2d 810, Supreme Court of Texas (1Dtiti1
One of the matters considered in this case was thr
matter of consideration under this type of contract. 'l'hr
City of Big Spring sought a declaratory judgment
against the State of Texas to determine the rights of
the parties under a certain contract wherein the c1h
had agreed to furnish water to the Big Spring's Statr
Hospital, an agency of the State of Texas, at a rate"'
ten cents per thousand gallons. The contract prorideil
that the quantity would not exceed three hundred thou·
·
sand gallons per day an d wou ld contmue
as 1ong ·is
'· tl1
state, in good faith, maintained and operated the ho'·
pital on a site within the city. The contract was cuten
1
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into in 1938 and the parties had performed under it
since that time. The city complained that the contract
11 as costing it money in recent years because the cost oi
treatment antl distribution of water had increased substantially since 1938. The cost of water to the city for
<lelirery to the hospital during the period 1960-1964
was 33.75 cents per thousand gallons. The Texas cou.rt
took cognizance of the fact that the state had spent in
excess of 18 million dollar establishing the hospital
facilities and had a payroll of approximately $91,000
per month. The court considered these items to be a
substantial benefit to the City of Big Spring and suffieient consideration for the contract. After reviewing
the circumstances of that transaction and expenditures
made by the state, the Texas Court found:
The State has paid a valuable consideration
for its contract right to purchase water from the
City, to-wit, the establishment and maintenance
of the hospital since the late 1930's. Its acceptance of the benefits under the contract makes
the City's obligation to furnish water needed
by the State a subsisting and binding obligation.
Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority v. City of
San Antonio, 145 Tex. 611, 200 S.,V. 2d 989
(194<7) . See also Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155
Tex. 179, 284 S.,V. 2d 340 (1956); Portland
Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co., 150
Tex. 533, 243 S.W. 2d 823 ( 1952) ; Landley v.
Norris, 141 Tex. 405, 173 S.,V. 2d 454, 148
A.L.R. 555 (1943).

\
I

I

I
\

The facts of the above case are entirely analogous
,n this situation and the rule announced above should
l1f d t
.
· e ermmative
here.

1
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However, if this court determines there was a nee<l
for some independent consideration to support the mu
grant of water, there was a specific monetary consideration for this grant. The legislature in 1890 appropriated
$10,000.00 for the improvement of the Capitol grounds
on condition that the City execute this grant, Stipulation of Fact No. 3 ( R. 11). Also, the State has continued to expend substantial amounts of money to improve and maintain the Capitol grounds as a public park
in reliance of the 1890 grant, Stipulation of Fact Nos.
12 and 13 (R. 15). But the point here is, there wa.1
consideration for this grant and the adequacy of it can·
not be questioned at this time. This is fundamental
contract law.
The general rule that the adequacy of the
consideration is immaterial has been undoubted
ever since the concept of consideration began to
be developed. 17 Am. J ur. 2d, Contrac'ts, § 10!
p. 446.
Also see 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 127.
There is absolutely no basis upon which to con·
elude that there was a lack of consideration for tbe
grant of water in 1890, and the present City Comm~·
sion has no power to rescind this contract.
B. AS TO THE 1926 CONTRACT.
The 1926 agreement specifically provided that the
free use of water was extended to the additional ]and)
.
· · · the
which had been acqmred by the State adJ01nmg
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present Capitol grounds in consideration of the improvement and maintenance of said lands as a public park.

There is no doubt but what the City received substantial benefits under the 1926 agreement. The enlargement of the public park around the Capitol makes
it a raluable asset to the City. The State has spent in
excess of $350,000.00 in constructing, improving and
maintaining the entire Capitol grounds as a public park
md tourist attraction (R. 15). This park attracts thousands of visitors annually, many of whom are residents
of the City. The Daughters of the Utah Pioneers
)luseum has been constructed on this later acquired
land and receives approximately 200,000 visitors annually (R. H). This surely results in many direct and
' indirect financial benefits to the City.
It is costing the State approximately $40,000.00
annually to maintain the Capitol grounds as a public
park (R. 15). This is a continuing benefit to the City
rnd will remain an obligation on the State as long as it
maintains the seat of state government on these
grounds. The benefits to the City under this arrangement are substantial and sufficient to sustain this agreement, 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 121 and 122.

It is no answer to this propositiou to state that
:iie1e grounds would have been maintained in any event.
Whether Utah would be enjoying the extensive aml
:ttraf·ti\'e Capitol grounds it now has may be questionJhle. But the fact is that the City bargained for this
• ''l<litional public park and the State has performed 011
I

\

I
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this agreement. After receiving the benefits undo,
'
d [JI,·
agreement for all of these years the City should not nirn
be allowed to disclaim its legally incurred obligations.

POINT IV

IN THE ALTERNATIVE IT IS sumrn
TED THAT THE GRANT OF WATER m,
THE CITY CAN BE SUSTAINED AS cm ..
VEY ANCE OF A PORTION OF THE CITYi
WATER RIGHT.

The legislature in granting Salt Lake City lb
charter in 1888 empowered the City to sell, lease, conrn
or dispose of property both real and personal for tlit.
benefit of the City, Utah Compiled Laws of 1888, li:
X, § 306. There is nothing in the record to indicate U1,: I
this particular source of water was at the time of tl:t
conveyance being devoted to public use or was needcJ
to meet the reasonably foreseeable demands of the Ci!:
Indeed this water was apparently surplus to the City·
needs and as such could be sold. 10 McQuillin, M1111ir
pal Corporations, § 28.38a (3rd ed. 1966). Also set,
§ 28.43 for transfer of property for a public use. fur .
ther, the law usually indulges in presumptions iu fari':
111
of the authority of a municipality to convey and '
leITality of a conveyance. 10 McQuillin, Municipa/Cl' ,
v~rations, § 28.47 (3rd ed. 1966). This court has e: 1'
1
concluded that city may dispose of a public utilitY "' '1'
it is in the best interests of the City to do so. McDoiw
v. Price, 45 Utah 464, 466, 146 Pac. 550 (1915).

!

!

1

i

1
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The resolution setting forth this conveyance u~c:s
the 1rnrd "grant" and this is generally sufficient to conrcy an interest in real property.
The word "grant" is of very general use as
a word of conveyance. It has lost its restricted
meaning at common law and is at the present
date effectual to convey an estate in a corporeal
hereditament. 6 Thompson on Real Property
§ 3130 (Replacement 1962).
This principle was noted by the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in the case of Higgins v. Oklahoma City, l 27
P. 2d 845 (1937):
"Grant" and "conveyance" are words often
used interchangeably and either is sufficient as
an operative word in the deed to pass title to a
present state.

It seems clear that the City at the time it made this
grant intended to pass a permanent vested right to the
use of this water to the State.
i
r
11
1"

f'
11

Further, the grant was sufficiently definite to
L~nstitute a valid conveyance of a water right. The
place where the water was to be used was abundantly
dear. This included the Capitol grounds and buildings,
nothing more is needed in this regard. The nature of
use is also adequately spelled out. The water was to
~used for the irrigation of the Capitol grounds in
rder that they may be maintained as a public park and
;or the domestic requirements of the various state office
1
"Jt]dings which were to be constructed upon this
11
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ground. The City obviously knew the point at whicn :
the water was to be diverted and the quantity requireu. •
as it has been delivering the water for many years.
As a matter of water law the fact that a water
right does not set forth an exact quantity of water doei I
not def eat the right. This court has sustained a fractional apportionment of water between users whm
no specific quantity was given as not being indefinilr
and uncertain, Argyle v. IJ;Jitchell, 59 Utah 263, 20i
Pac. 542 ( 1921). This principle has also been marlt
abundantly clear in the case of Indian Reservatiom.
The United States Supreme Court has held that when
the government reserved land for the Indians it im·
pliedly reserved sufficient water to carry out the pur·
poses of the reservation, Arizona v. California, 373 CS
546 ( 1963) . In this case the court found it proper Ir•
determine the quantity of water allowed under lltr
water right based on evidence other than the document
which created the right. The above case is not set ou!
for the purpose of urging any reservation concept bul
rather to demonstrate that there is nothing impropt:
in determining the quantity of water under a speciti'
water right based on extrinsic evidence, rather than tnr
limited language of the document creating the rign.I
Any ambiguity concerning the extent of the grant If,
1890 was clarified by the 1926 agreement between tcr
.
tt contricl
parties. This was t h e purpose of t h is 1a er ...
·
ff1c1e
The fact that the City has been supplymg su ··
]eares
water for State purposes f or some 75 years ' ,
1
•

1
'
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doubt that both parties understood what quantity of
water was conveyed.

Further, this conveyance is not defective simply
betause it is evidenced by a resolution. This question
11as presented to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
. :I sth Circuit in the relatively early case of 1lforgan v.
t \ Juhnson, 106 F. 452 ( 190.1). In that case t~e ~ity of
t • Denm attempted to rescmd a deed by which it had
uy motion conveyed certain real property to an indiridual some 18 years before the action arose. The court
15
u1 sustaining the conveyance stated that, under such
:c mcumstances, it would have to find an insurmountable
n· legal hurdle before it could be induced to disturb
l!· Jcfendant's possession .
1

.S

POINT V.

THE ADOPTION OF THE UTAH CONou: )TITUTION DID NOT APPLY RETROACbul Ti\'ELY TO VOID THIS GRANT.

en!

1ptI

cin(

In the lower court the City relied heavily on Utah

tht lo111t. Art. XI, § 6 to avoid the consequences of its

ghl

t \r,

~nor corrunitment to furnish water to the State. This
·~·lion prohibits a municipality from directly or in-

thr :rectly selling or disposing of its water rights. We
acl ~re pointed out above that this constitutional provi11
er,· does not apply to the facts of this case. However,
1·
addition the grant here inYolved was made in 1890
1
'
the constitution was not adopted until 1896. It

I
1
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is a well-accepted general rule that constitutional provisions only operate prospectively unless it is clear
there was a contrary intention. The United States
Supreme Court spelled this concept out in the relatively early decision of Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S.
36 (1889):
Constitutions as well as statutes are construed
to operate prospectively only, unless, on the face
of the instrument or enactment, the contrarr
intention is manifest beyond reasonable doubt.
This court enunciated this same rule in the case of
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah
222 ( 1898) shortly after the Utah Constitution was
adopted:
Constitutions, as well as statutes, should oµ·
erate prospectively only, unless the words em·
ployed show a clear intention that they shoulu
have a retrospective effect. This rule of con·
struction as to statutes should always be adherer!
to, unless there be something on the face of the
statute putting it beyond doubt that the leg1~·
lature meant it to operate retrospectively. Cou·
ley, Const. Lim. p. 73; Suth. St. Const. ~ .J.fiH·
465.
This same principle has been applied to constitutional
amendments, McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 9
Utah 203, 85 P. 2d 608 (1938) and Snow v. Keddiny·
ton, 113 Utah 325 195, P. 2d 234 (1948).
11

The very language of the constitution makes i:
clear that the above quoted section was only to opera!t
prospectively. The section discusses water right ... ··
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j

now or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it."

This language evidences only a prospective intent. It
would certainly be an unsettling propositoin to find
out that all pre-constitutional rights were in jeopardy
where constitutional prohibitions were enacted. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 2201 (3rd ed. 1943)
discusses the evil of applying laws retroactively.
Retrospective operation is not favored by the
courts, however, and a law will not be construed
as retroactive unless the act clearly, by express
language or necessary implication, indicates that
the legislature intended a retroactive application.
The rule is the converse of the general principle
that statutes are to operate prospectively and
is founded on judicial premonition that retroactive laws are characterized by want of notice
and lack of knowledge of past conditions and
that such laws disturb feelings of security in past
transactions.
The kinship between ex post facto laws and
civil retroactive laws is likewise recognized, and
since the ex p9st facto provision is limited to
criminal statutes, protection from improper
retroactivity has been included within the due
process clause.
The City seeks to reap the benefits of one constitutional provision and ignore the remainder of this
important document. The City's position gives the
impre~sion that there was one set of rules prior to 1896
and another set after. We do not argue that what con~titution prohibits cannot be allowed, but we do not
heliere there was any intent to disrupt vested rights.
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In fact Utah Const. Art. XXIV,
opposite intent:

§ 1

spells just !ht

In order that no inconvenience may arise, br
reason of the change from a Territorial to ~
State Government, it is hereby declared that all
writs, actions, prosecutions, judgments, claim~
and contracts, as well of individuals as of bodie,
corporate, both public and private, shall con·
tinue as if no change had taken place; and all
process which may issue, under the authoritr ·
of the Territory of Utah, previous to its admi;.
sion into the Union, shall be as valid as if issued I
in the name of the State of Utah.

1

1

This provision makes it clear that the rights ac· l
quired by the State under the 1890 grant continue1l
It is further provided in Utah Const. Art. XIX; I
that:
All institutions and other property of tht
Territory, upon the adoption of this Constitu·
tion, shall become the Institutions and proper~
of the State of Utah.
To apply this constitutional provision retroactively
as contended for by the City would be an impairme11!
of contract under Art. I, § 10 of the United State'
Constitution. Rights acquired under the legislation ii
a territory are subject to Art. I, § 10 of the l'uiteil
States Constitution against impairment of contrac:,
The United States Supreme Court so held in the c:i'· j
of TValla Walla City v. Walla Walla U1 ater Compan I
172 U.S. 1 (1898). This was an action bytbewat,c
company to enjoin the city from erecting waterworo'
f Wad'
pursuant to a city ordinance. The Territory o
1
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incorporated the City of 'Valla 'Valla and gave
it the power to provide a water supply for its inhabitants and to grant the use of city streets for the purpose
of laying pipes to furnish water to the residents of the
city. The terms of such a grant could not exceed twentytire years. Pursuant to this legislation the city granted
the water company the right to lay and maintain water
lines and supply water to the city for a twenty-five year
period. The city also agreed that it would not maintain a water system of its own during this time. The
contract had been in force for about six years when the
city enacted an ordinance to construct its own water
supply system. The court found that the city was
bound by the provisions of its prior contract and this
contract was protected by Art. I, § IO of the United
States Constitution. Also see Los Angeles v. Los
A11gelcs Cit.I/ TV at er Company, supra, and New Orleans
Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, supra, on this point. These
cases make it clear that the constitutional protection
<'gainst impairment of contracts applies to public contracts. Also see 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law,
: Hl. The above cited cases also make it clear that it
111akes no difference whether the impairment occurs by
itatute or under a state constitutional provision.

iugfo11

POINT VI.
THE STATE HAS ACQUIRED THE

~IGHT TO THE USE OF THIS 'VATER UN-

I

DER THE DOCTRINE OF ADVERSE POSIESSION.
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If the court were to determine that the prior gr::
of the City was invalid, the State is still entitled
the use of this water under the doctrine of adverse pn:i
session. Ever since 1890, the State has had posses~i,,:
and use of a sufficient quantity of water for the Capit, I
grounds and the buildings located thereon. The U;
has been made under a claim of right, exclusive of al I
other rights and has been used continuously witl1uul
interruption, openly and notoriously to plaintiff ar, 1
all the world for more than 7 5 years. Such use is sutt:I1
cient to establish a right. Hammond v. Johnson,~'
Utah 20, 66 Pac. 2d 894 (1937). We are awareth11
the Utah Legislature in 1939 terminated the poi' I
bility of acquiring any further rights to water unael
this doctrine, Section 73-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, Howerer
any right which had vested prior to that time was nu
affected by this enactment. Therefore, the State'
entitled to the quantity of water which it was bent·
ficially using as of 1939.

1

While it is generally considered that properr
held by a municipal corporation for a governmenti
purpose cannot be acquired by adverse possession, tberi
is authority which holds that other municipal pro~er~
may be lost by adverse use. 10 McQuillin, 1Uumt1fr
Corporatiom, § 28.55 (3rd ed. 1966).

I
I
I

The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon es
.
· hts 1j
pressly held that a city can lose its water rig , ·.
. ot B a"·e1,. 299 p, :JI
adverse possession, Ebell v. City
1

'

(1931):
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I

The statute of limitations runs against the
dty in its proprietary or busines capacity. Phillips Y. Leininger, 280 Ill., 132, 117 N.E. 497,
498. A city can lose its water rights by adverse
possession and user by another, amounting to
prescription. 3 Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights (2d ed.) p. 2599, § 1441. The power to
provide a water system is not governmental or
legislative in character, but strictly proprietary,
and the city engaged in the prosecution of such
an improvement and selling water for gain is
clothed in such authority and subject to the same
liabilities as a private person. Tone v. Tillamook,
58 Or. 382, 386, 114 P. 938; Twohy v. Ochoco,
108 Or. I, 40, 210 P. 873, 216 P. 189, and cases
there cited.
POINT VII.
AT THIS LATE DATE THE CITY SHOULD

XOT BE ALLOWED TO QUESTION THE
l'ALIDITY OF ITS GRANT OF WATER TO
THE STATE.
A. ESTOPPEL.

Under the fundamental principles of equity, the
City should now be estopped to deny the validity of
its prior grant of water. We have already pointed out
the f~cts and circumstances surrounding the exec~tion
of tlus grant. The City should not now be permitted
I '.0 ta~e an inconsistent position regarding its author.ity
\ ir raise technical objections concerning the execution
\ VI the document after the State has relied to its detri-

I

\
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ment on the City's action. Their prior representatimiare now a bar to the present claims. Large sum.1111
money have been expended by the State to construe'.
buildings and improve and maintain the grounds,,.
cording to the terms of the grant and with the full/
knowledge of the City.

Nor is there any doubt that the doctrine of estoppti
applies to a municipal corporation under this type 11'.
grant. This Court in the case of JV all v. Salt Lake Cit.11 •
50 Utah 593, 168 Pac. 766 (1917), specificallyallowe1 1
this defense against Salt Lake City. In the Wall cast.•I
the City attempted to disavow a prior conveyance nt ·
land. The court found that the city council after a corn·
plete investigation had authorized the conveyance anl
that the plaintiff had relied on the conveyance to !lie
extent of lending money on the property. Under thN
circumstances, it was held that the city was 00 11
estopped to deny its former action:
We believe, as was said by the court in Ci~
1
of Sullivan v. Tichenor, supra, cited by app~
lant, that:

"A municipal corporation can no more.pr?f.iJ~ :'
fraud upon property owners than,,an md11 1 ••
and mav be estopped by conduct.
·
1

Or, as :aid by Judge Dillon, in note one to~.
.
t tl1e chan1c.c
section
a b ove quote d , re f ~rrmg
o
I·
of acts necessary to constitute an estoppe ·

I

The principle of estoppel in pais has heen .·.:
'
plied to exceptional cases w I1ere the eJeme1.
b ,
calling for its exercise appear to have eeo ·
t
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abandonment of the public use for the prescriptive period, inclosure and expensive improvements, such as large and costly buildings, or acts
of ihe municipality inducing the abutter to belie\C that there is no longer any street, and the
expenditure of money in reliance upon the acts
of the municipality. The absolute bona fides of
the abutter or adverse possessor is a most important factor where an estoppel in pais is claimed.
The acts relied on must be of such character as
to amount to a fraud, if the city were permitted
to claim otherwise.
We hold that this case falls within the exceptional class of cases ref erred to by Judge Dillon,
and that it is the duty of the court to decide it as
"right and justice require." It is our opinion
that the city is estopped from claiming the premises in question as a public street.
This same concept was expressly stated by the
court of civil appeals of Texas in the case of City of
Bir1 Sprinu, supra:
Eve11 if the Contract is invalid, we are of the
opinion that the City is in no position to complain. It is estopped to do so under the plainest
principles of equity. In Boiles v. City of Abilene, 276 S.,V. 2d 922, Eastland C.C.A., writ
ref., it was held that the City could not repudiate
the obligations of a Contract on the ground of its
partial invalidity while retaining its benefits, the
Court saying: "It is the settled law that a municipal corporation is estopped to deny the validity
of a contract where it exacts performance from
the other party and accepts the benefits accruing
to it therefrom."
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B. LACHES.
Salt Lake City is certainly in no position to questior
the form or substance of the 1890 grant. By wait:no:
some _10 years t~ raise these questions, the City is u'.j
questionably gmlty of laches and lack of diligenct
Although some authorities hold that the doctrine o! 1
laches does not apply to a municipal corporation, mam
hold to the contrary. This Court in the case of Sa/1;
Lake City v. Investment Company, 43 Utah 181, IJJI'
P~c. 603 ( 1913_), has ~xpressly ~e~o~ize~ that the dGr·
trme of laches is applicable to cities m tlus state: i
11

1

It is also a well-recognized rule that all tl1t (
consequences of notice, laches, and lack of dili·'
gence apply to a municipal corporation with tP.:
same effect that those matters do to prirate cor
poration or individuals.

The question of whether laches applies to a par·
ticular situation should be determined from the fact'
of the particular case and whether injury has resulteil
10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 49.09 (or 1
ed. 1966). There is no doubt that the State has relie'J I
on this grant of water and would be injured if the gr:in I
were not upheld. The City is guilty of unreasonaoJ, /,
delay in bringing this action and as a matter of eqwi:,
should now be barred from questioning its prior graut

i

POINT VIII.

I

.J

ANY CLAIM FOR PAYMENT THAT T~~ I
CITY HAD FOR THE VALUE OF WAT

I
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i

\rHICH IT HAS DELIVERED TO THE
ST.ATE IS NO'V BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS.
If the City ever had a valid claim for payment for
the rnlue of the water which it has historically delivered
to the State for use on the Capitol grounds that claim
1s now barred under the provisions of Section 78-1225, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This section provides
that an action for claims of this nature must be commenced within the four years after the cause of action
accrued. Over seventy-five years have elapsed since the
City entered into the arrangement to deliver water to
I the State.

I

Limitations of actions are generally applicable to
when it is acting in its business or proprietary capacity. This rule is stated in 17 McQuillin,
.1Iunicipal Corporations, § 49.06 (3rd. ed. 1968), as

a municipality

follows:

:,.I

,; I

I

ir

ik I
1
·' !

111

i
I

.I

.

It is generally held that the statute of limitations may be interposed as a defense in an action
of a municipal corporation to enforce rights held
by it in its private or corporation capacity.

Also see the Oregon case of Ebell v. City of Baker,
~U9 Pac. 313 ( 1931), where this same rule was found
:o be applicable.

CONCLUSION

It, I The grant of water by the City for use on the State
'~ \ Capitol grounds and the buildings located on these

i
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grounds is a valid and binding obligation on the Citv
In accordance with the terms and provisions of tk
grant the City should be required to continue to deliver
sufficient water for use on the Capitol grounds anl
in the buildings without charge to the State.
Dated this 21st day of March, 1968.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
DALLIN '"·JENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

38
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

